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At present New Zealand Oil & Gas Ltd (NZOG) is involved 
in the Tui oil field project, with estimated reserves of  up to 
41.7 million barrels, and the Kupe gas/light oil condensate 
project, which has estimated reserves of  254 petajoules of  
sales gas, 14.7 million barrels of  light oil/condensate and 
1.1 million tonnes of  LPG. According to NZOG, there are 
other offshore exploration projects with optimistic prospects 
(NZOG, 2008). An obligated member of  the International 
Energy Agency, New Zealand is required to implement sets 
of  co-operative strategies to counter market fluctuations and 
instability. 
This article will describe the contemporary situation in the 
global oil market and its implications for New Zealand energy 
security. It attempts to illuminate some of  the issues connected 
with New Zealand oil policy by observing the forces and the 
main players in the global market. It surveys the oil market 
chronologically to explain how each player came to the global 
scene and how their policies shape the complicated oil market 
and industry. 
The issue of  energy security has dominated contemporary 
politics round the world. Under the pressure of  soaring fuel 
and oil prices, politicians seek policies that minimise the 
negative implications of  the sudden increase and ensure the 
security of  energy. The security of  energy resources is vital for 
the continuation of  economic development and growth. The 
sudden increase in the price of  oil in recent months has had 
several consequences for oil producers and consumers. To 
understand the reasons for such an acceleration in oil prices, 
the role of  the main players in the global oil market, and their 
interactions and motivations, need to be identified. But first, 
some historical background. 
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Introduction
Growing concern over the ever-increasing price of oil makes investigating new 
approaches to oil policy necessary. In the last year the price of oil has increased 
sharply due to the instability and the political tensions in the Middle East. Such 
an increase in prices in a short time has significant implications for oil-dependent 
societies. It also means that major oil consumers like China and the United States 
invest in storing oil, which could result in more shortage and even higher prices. 
Although governments attempt to lessen their dependency on fossil fuel by 
investing in alternative fuels, in the short term they need to form strategies to 
cope with such unstable situations. New Zealand in this regard remains a unique 
case, with many underdeveloped oil reserves and a possible future as an active 
player in the international oil market.
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The oil market
During the last hundred years, since oil became a commodity 
in trade, the players in the market have often changed their 
policies and their association with other participants. These 
shifts are the result of  changes in the political and historical 
context. In 1920 when a subsidiary of  Royal Dutch Shell and 
Standard Oil of  New York signed an oil contract in India, the 
profit of  other major oil-producing companies, such as the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was threatened. This resulted 
in the signing of  a contract entitled the As Is Agreement 
at Achnacarry Castle in Scotland. This contract laid the 
foundation for the formation of  the oil cartels. The cartels 
became significantly influential in determining the price of  
oil in later decades (Stevens, 2008). During the Second World 
War, with the exception of  those in Russia and the United 
States, most of  the oil reserves were under the control of  the 
major oil companies known later as the seven sisters (Chapman 
and Khanna, 2006). These companies controlled both 
upstream (exploration, drilling, processing 
hydrocarbons into gas, condensate and oil) 
and downstream (refining and distribution) 
activities in the world oil market. Usually, 
contracts between the companies and 
the oil-producing countries were based 
on revenue that the oil companies were 
obligated to pay to the producing state. 
After the Second World War the oil-
producing countries gradually became aware of  what they 
were losing with their existing contracts. The growing power 
of  the oil companies was increasingly limiting the control of  
the producing countries over their activities and the price of  
oil. As the result of  the As Is Agreement, oil field development 
in the Middle East was halted and exploitation of  oil and 
its transfer to Canada and the United States increased 
(Sampson, 1991). During the process of  the nationalisation 
of  oil in Mexico and Iran, the power of  the companies in 
isolating producing countries became evident (Parra, 2004, 
pp.25-7; Kobrin, 1985). Other oil-producing countries were 
also challenged by nationalist movements which centralised 
their activities with the nationalisation of  natural resources, 
mainly oil (Odell, 1968). 
At the same time, producing countries passed laws 
to limit the power of  the companies over the income 
received for crude oil and its products. Under increasing 
pressure from both producing and consuming countries, 
the companies developed new strategies and established 
‘operating companies’ to accommodate new policies and 
to lessen losses. These operating companies later became 
another influential force in determining the price of  oil in 
the global market. The companies were established to enable 
the major oil companies to maintain their power over oil 
resources: following their establishment, a consortium of  
operating companies supervised the management of  the oil 
resources. Companies in the consortium were aware of  one 
anothers’ activities. Consequently, the major oil companies 
extended their activities in the market. Major companies 
became involved in the domestic politics of  the oil-producing 
countries in order to protect their interests and those of  their 
respective countries. 
A decade later the oil-producing countries became more 
powerful in the oil market. The unilateral contracts and tax 
system on oil were reviewed. Producing countries attempted 
to find customers who would sign contracts based on ‘equal 
share’ terms, and established national oil companies which 
became involved in oil activities under the supervision of  
their governments (McPherson, 2003, p.185). Most of  the 
producing countries at this time used oil income as the main 
revenue for national economic development. Governments 
thus became directly involved in the process of  distributing 
oil income as they transformed into complicated bureaucratic 
systems. They became rentier states, funded by rent they 
received from natural resources instead of  tax. Many 
scholars argue that the oil rentier states became separated 
from the society, and that the oil rent retarded the process 
of  democratisation (Sandbakken, 2006). However, during 
the 1950s nationalist movements in the Middle East gave 
legitimacy to these national claims over resources. 
After the Second World War, as countries like Japan and 
Italy rapidly industrialised they too became increasingly 
dependent on oil companies. Soon developing countries 
realised that to sustain development and economic growth, 
security of  energy was vital. Their dependency on oil 
companies created a potential strategic threat which needed 
to be addressed. In order to counterbalance the power of  
the major oil companies, governments established national 
oil companies to counter the monopoly of  the cartels in the 
market place. Furthermore, the formation of  national oil 
companies in both producing and consuming countries was 
the result of  mistrust of  the cartels over the issues of  the price 
of  crude oil and distribution of  its products.
As the battle between the major oil companies and 
governments continued, some new and small oil companies 
entered the oil market. These companies, mainly in the United 
States, were impelled by capitalist competitive market ideals. 
But in reality the hegemony of  the major oil companies over 
resources left no place for their participation. The big companies’ 
dominating power in the market enabled them to sabotage 
the activities of  the smaller companies by breaking the price 
of  imported crude oil in the United States. In order to break 
their monopoly over the oil industry, in the 1950s the United 
States Congress attempted to pass a law to increase the state’s 
power over the major companies. Heated debates in Congress 
demonstrated how the issue of  security was interconnected with 
After the failure of a voluntary import control 
plan, the Eisenhower administration established 
a mandatory ‘oil import control programme’  
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that of  state control over oil companies. After the failure of  a 
voluntary import control plan, the Eisenhower administration 
established a mandatory ‘oil import control programme’ (Cox 
and Skidmore-Hess, 1999, p.92). With this programme the 
United States Congress supported independent oil companies 
in their struggle against the oil cartels. The United States 
became more directly involved in regulating the activities of  
the oil companies, valuing their products and reviewing their 
policies. Ironically, the legislation gave better opportunities to 
the operating companies to expand their areas of  activities in 
the oil industry. 
The law passed by Congress and the limitation of  oil 
imports to the United States had a negative impact on oil-
producing countries. Although not the sole factor, the Congress 
decision motivated technocrats in oil-producing countries to 
challenge existing national oil strategies. They were by then 
aware of  the significance of  oil in the international market 
and national development. Following the nationalisation 
movements, they changed their oil strategies and encouraged 
independent oil companies to sign contacts which gave much 
greater shareholding to the producing countries in a strongly 
competitive environment. This ended the hegemony of  the 
major oil companies over the market (Time, 1958, p.2). As the 
result of  these new contracts and the formation of  national 
oil companies, governments in producing and consuming 
countries achieved a more active role in the market.
The formation of OPEC
In order to counter the United States legislation on oil imports, 
Russia exported its oil on barter terms, offering technical and 
financial support in exchange for oil. Challenged by such 
lucrative oil deals, the power of  oil-producing countries was 
more limited in the market. The battle between oil companies 
and governments, the United States oil legislation, Russia’s 
oil policy, and competition amongst developed countries and 
their dependency on oil companies were some of  the many 
issues that then faced oil-producing countries. The necessity 
of  co-operation was a strategic and urgent reality. None of  the 
producing countries could face these challenges in isolation. 
For this reason, an intergovernmental Organisation of  the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries – OPEC – was established. 
The organisation aimed to make oil-producing countries 
more influential in the oil market. Between May 1960, when 
Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed on 
the foundation of  OPEC, and 1975, 11 countries joined the 
organisation (OPEC, 2008). In the 1970s OPEC had about 
90% of  the world’s operating oil reserves under its control. 
The organisation’s priority was to counter the power of  the 
oil cartels, and thus prevent any further decline in the price 
of  oil. 
The ‘OPEC order’ – 1974–1986 – refers to the time when 
the organisation became the main body for determining the 
price of  oil and for instigating global economic shocks. Soon 
after the establishment of  OPEC the strategic threat posed 
by such a powerful organisation became evident. Following 
the October 1973 war between Israel and Egypt and Syria 
(known in Israel as the Yom Kippur war and 
in the Arab countries as the Ramadan war), 
Arab oil-producing countries put the United 
States and the Netherlands under an oil 
embargo for their support of  Israel. For the 
first time some producing countries used oil 
as a political tool in international politics. The 
oil shock that followed the embargo reshaped 
strategic thinking about energy security. In 
1974 the price of  oil jumped from $US2.37 
to $US11.51 per barrel within a few months 
(CBC, 2007). This was the first oil shock that spread economic 
recession throughout the world, especially in the United 
States. At the same time, the United States government 
continued support for legislation regarding the limitation of  
oil imports into the United States.1 Although in the following 
decades OPEC faced inter-organisational challenges as well 
as external pressures, it remains to this day a very influential 
organisation in the oil market. 
During the 1980s, due to disagreements amongst members, 
political confrontation, and the bombing of  both Iran and 
Iraq’s oil infrastructures, OPEC lost power. Moreover, 
members of  OPEC are competitors in the market and the 
organisation is sometimes dominated by one or other of  them. 
During the 1980s Saudi Arabia became the organisation’s 
dominant voice. This factor is crucial in identifying OPEC 
policies that affect the price of  oil. Members of  OPEC are 
divided into two groups, usually referred to as the ‘hawks’ and 
the ‘doves’. The member countries have different interests in 
the market and consequently have differing views regarding 
the limits of  production and the price regime. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are countries with vast oil 
reserves and small populations. For these countries – the doves 
– increasing production with cheaper prices is the goal of  their 
OPEC policies. They argue that by increasing the market 
share, they can, in the long term, achieve their economic 
goals. They encourage more production, which, as it needs 
more investment in upstream activities, benefits them and the 
development of  their oil industry. Other countries, such as 
Iran, Nigeria and Iraq, support a decrease in production and 
higher prices. These countries – the hawks – have smaller oil 
reserves and larger populations. They argue that saturating 
the market with oil will not guarantee more investment and 
may instead have a negative impact, as supply outstrips 
demand (Scanlon, 2003). OPEC oil policies are influenced 
OPEC policies in the last four decades have 
not been harmonious or at ease. In many 
circumstances, political disagreements among 
the members have created fluctuations in the 
market.   
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by these contradictory strategies. It was only in the late 1990s 
that members of  OPEC decided on a price range mechanism 
aimed at keeping the price per barrel between $US22 and 
$US28. They did this by controlling the amount of  crude 
oil they exported. The determination of  the price was based 
on technical issues rather than geopolitical concerns. The 
members decided that reductions or increases in production 
should depend on demand.
The political interactions amongst the members of  
OPEC have influenced the production and the price of  oil. 
For OPEC members, most of  whom have a ‘one product 
economy’, the economic impact of  market fluctuation extends 
into every area of  their economy. OPEC policies in the last 
four decades have not been harmonious or at ease. In many 
circumstances, political disagreements among the members 
have created fluctuations in the market. These fluctuations, 
the growing power of  the International Energy Agency and 
its members, especially the United States, and competition 
among multinational oil corporations have reduced the power 
of  OPEC and this in turn has affected its members’ national 
policies. 
OPEC is viewed by the West as a 
powerful cartel which should be countered. 
In May 2007 the United States House 
of  Representatives passed a bill that 
would allow the Justice Department to 
sue members of  OPEC for applying an 
anti-competitive practice (the price range 
mechanism) to the oil price. John Conyers, 
the House Judiciary Committee chairman, 
introduced the No Oil-producing and 
Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Bill, and 
blamed cartels like OPEC for the soaring 
oil prices. The United States Senate Judiciary Committee 
signed off  on similar legislation in April. Similar bills were 
vetoed by the White House in 2000, 2004 and 2005. The 
White House may also veto the recent bill, which it believes 
will put upward pressure on the price of  gasoline by disrupting 
supply (Randell, 2007).
The formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
In November 1974, in order to counter the power of  OPEC, 
the main consuming countries formed the International 
Energy Agency in Paris. The IEA was formed within the 
framework of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the members of  the OECD 
became members of  the IEA. The main goal of  the agency 
was to provide security for energy distribution to consuming 
countries. Later, the organisation’s activities expanded 
to include environmental issues, carbon emissions and 
encouraging the use of  alternative energy sources. Its first 
mission, however, was to establish policies to counter future 
oil shocks like the one in 1973 (IEA, 2008). Although not very 
successful in dealing with the aftermath of  the first oil shock, 
the IEA proposed policies to minimise the negative impact 
of  oil shocks in the future. It placed significant emphasis 
on creating policies to harmonise the energy policies of  its 
members and to eradicate differences amongst them. 
The agency analyses – in both official and unofficial 
ways – issues which are vital to the management of  oil crises. 
Sharing oil amongst the members in times of  crisis and 
the strategic storage of  90 days worth of  oil are among the 
agency’s pre-emptive measures to deal with future oil shocks 
(Richardson, 2008, p.14). In 1979, the second oil shock 
was an inevitable outcome of  the Iranian Revolution. The 
policy of  organising a co-operative response to oil shocks or 
any severe disruption of  oil supply prevents the isolation of  
any one country. Obviously, the IEA is acutely aware of  the 
competitive and privatised nature of  capitalist economies and 
of  the implications of  any oil crisis. The members agree that 
in times of  emergency governments are obliged to intervene 
in the market. The agency strongly emphasises co-operation 
amongst its 27 member countries. This policy is based on the 
premise that oil-consuming countries are mutually dependent 
in the matter of  energy security. In this role the IEA became 
the buffer zone between OPEC and the consuming countries 
and between the cartels and consuming countries. 
The IEA has also developed policies to encourage the 
use of  alternative energy, initiated carbon taxes to reduce 
environmental pollution, and encouraged another tax on 
the exploration industry. The latter slowed the process of  
exploration in the 1990s which has been an influential factor 
in raising the price of  oil. The decrease in investment and in 
exploring activities over decades resulted in the reduction of  
OPEC capacity for production. The taxes implemented by 
the IEA enabled the consuming countries to gain more benefit 
from importing oil than the producing countries of  OPEC 
from exporting crude oil (Toman, 2002, p.21). However, in 
the 1990s there was no significant oil shock to test the IEA’s 
policies on dealing with market fluctuations. In recent decades 
their emphasis on alternative sources of  energy, reducing 
carbon emissions and investing in oil exploration in the non-
OPEC countries has had a significant impact on limiting the 
power of  OPEC in the oil market. However, this policy has 
had a longer-term negative impact on the oil market. Since 
2003 the reduction of  the resources of  non-OPEC members 
has created a gradual vacuum in the market. This vacuum is 
the result of  the lack of  investment in OPEC countries. They 
are now incapable of  increasing supply, due partly to the lack 
of  infrastructure (Oxburgh, 2008).2
...a comparison of Norway’s oil policies with 
those of other oil-producing countries can show 
how oil revenue policies which are not rentier 
ones can achieve societal benefits.   
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At the time that the IEA began operating in the market 
the first oil shock was over, so the focus of  its policies was 
to structure a system that would reduce the possibility of  
another shock (IEA, 2008). The IEA focused on alternative 
energy and increasing oil exploration activities to find new 
oil reserves in consuming countries like Norway and New 
Zealand. Exploration for oil in Norway sped that country’s 
development. Norway discovered oil resources after the 
process of  development and did not directly funnel its oil 
revenues into national development (Larsen, 2004, p.13). It 
created a reserve account under the supervision of  the ministry 
of  finance, which enabled the government to strengthen its 
monitory role in the industry without being directly involved 
in distributing rent. Domestically, oil did not turn into a black 
curse for Norway (Martinovits, 2002). 
In less than a decade after the exploration of  oil Norway 
moved from the bottom to the top in OECD rankings. 
Implementing egalitarian policies and a combination of  
national control along with the capitalisation of  the oil industry 
made Norway 60% richer. Norway is currently ranked as first 
in the United Nations Human Development Report. The oil 
revenues have contributed to a more equal distribution of  
wealth. Lack of  corruption in a solid democratic state, focusing 
on education as a key priority, and an emphasis on an anti-
corruption mentality are some of  the main factors that have 
made Norway successful. Transparency and accountability in 
government created confidence for building and managing 
public institutions and expectations (Larsen, 2004, p.24). 
Norway’s oil contracts are very simple. The government 
receives a 75% tax from both domestic and international 
companies. Revenues saved in the reserve bank are mainly 
spent on education, health services, and Norway’s involvement 
in the global oil market. Although it is not the focus of  this 
article, a comparison of  Norway’s oil policies with those 
of  other oil-producing countries can show how oil revenue 
policies which are not rentier ones can achieve societal 
benefits.
The contemporary context
It is clear that since 2003 OPEC has been increasing its 
influence in the oil market. This is to some extent the result 
of  regional instability, conflicts, lack of  infrastructure and 
investment in upstream activities, and the rise of  China and 
India as competitors for the United States. In addition to these 
factors, reduction in production capacities of  non-OPEC 
producing countries, an increase in the cost of  producing a 
barrel of  oil, and the decrease in the value of  the US dollar 
resulted in a sudden increase in the oil price.3 A similar oil 
shock to the one that created a global recession in the 1970s 
started in 2003 when the price of  oil increased from $US22 
to $US58 per barrel. Since 2003 the price of  oil has increased 
from $US58 to over $US125 per barrel. The rise in prices has 
affected the position of  OPEC in the oil market.
In most of  the analysis regarding the sudden increase in 
oil prices, the focus is on observing competitiveness amongst 
main consumers, and the rise of  demand especially from 
booming economies in China and India (Richardson, 2008; 
Neilsen, 2008; Aldred, 2008). Neither China nor India is a 
member of  the IEA. Thus, neither is obliged to accommodate 
their oil policies to IEA policy regulation. The rise of  China 
as the biggest consumer of  oil next to the 
United States has had a negative impact on 
the status of  the United States. The more a 
country uses energy, the more developed it 
is; thus, if  China overtakes the United States 
in using oil its rate of  growth will be higher 
than that of  the United States. Since the 
advent of  the oil industry the United States 
has been the largest consumer, one of  the 
main producers, and has an elite status in the 
market. The involvement of  US oil companies 
in the international market, and the country’s 
military and diplomatic capabilities have also contributed 
to its high status. Since the exploration of  oil in the Middle 
East, the United States has had naval ships in the Persian 
Gulf  to ensure the security of  supply. At the national level 
the United States’ control over oil prices is a practical way 
of  controlling the world’s economy. It is due to this strategy 
since the 1950s that the United States established a very close 
political relationship with Saudi Arabia, the world’s major oil 
producer. 
Being a member of  the IEA and also a producer, the United 
States has been able to influence oil prices from both sides. 
For decades the United States remained the most influential 
country in the oil market. The rise of  China reshapes this 
political structure. China imports most of  its oil from the 
Persian Gulf, and because the United States has a military 
presence in the Persian Gulf  any tension in the US–China 
relationship could result in economic disaster for China. 
In order to counter this potential security threat China has 
invested in contracts with Russia, Iran, Chad and Nigeria 
in order to diversify its energy sources. Chinese companies 
do not demand involvement in the national politics of  the 
producing countries. By not overtly combining politics with 
economics, China has gained advantages in countries like 
Chad and Nigeria. China’s Achilles heel is, however, the 
increasing number of  cars. Rising fuel prices could slow 
China’s development mechanism, as the country would be 
forced to spend more on crude oil and fuel (Renner, 2006). So 
the United States may yet achieve strategic advantages over 
China as a result of  the rising price of  oil.
China’s Achilles heel is, however, the increasing 
number of cars. Rising fuel prices could slow 
China’s development mechanism, as the 
country would be forced to spend more on 
crude oil and fuel   
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Oil speculators
These speculators are commodity traders who began their 
activities in the oil market in the 1980s. Before then, most 
contracts were decided and signed by commodity producers 
and those who used the actual products. The expansion of  the 
market and the increase in the value of  oil and its products 
have reshaped the market. During the last three decades 
many industries and even industrialised countries have been 
purchasing oil ahead. Speculators buy and sell future contracts 
for oil for future delivery. These contracts are deals on paper, 
under which the buyers are committed to purchase the sum 
of  oil indicated in the contract in the indicated time, and the 
producer is committed to deliver the oil to 
the buyer.  Trading the contracts is where 
the speculators could manipulate the 
market and influence the crisis. Speculators 
determine the price of  oil based on their 
estimation of  the future of  the geopolitics of  
the region and possible available resources 
in the future. They are more influential 
in creating short-term oil shocks than in 
establishing longer-term trends. 
Most of  the trades in the future are 
signed by industrial players, mainly within the oil industry. 
In this fashion they can ensure the continuity of  the flow of  
oil to their industry in future. Purchasing future oil contracts 
minimises the risk as any extra purchase of  oil can be re-sold 
in the market. Although such a system is very effective in 
ensuring the future of  an industry, not all the contracts in the 
market are materialised in real purchase or delivery. Some 
speculators would benefit not from contracts but rather from 
market fluctuations. For these players it is not necessarily the 
high price of  oil but rather the fluctuation in the market that 
ensures their benefit. The fact that the energy market has a 
very low risk of  investment compared to, for example, the 
mortgage market has motivated many to place their investment 
in the energy market. Billionaire investor George Soros, in a 
July 2008 address to American legislators, indicated that the 
rising price of  oil is significantly the result of  the increasing 
involvement of  investment institutions in the market as oil 
speculators (Chung, 2008). It is clear that speculators play 
a significant role in market fluctuations, and with economic 
downturns in the food, housing and financial sectors they will 
be more active in the market. Their presence in the market 
will result in more market fluctuations, specifically in the oil 
market where there is no clear picture regarding accessible 
or existing resources. They increase an artificial demand 
for a commodity which will inevitably increase the oil price. 
However, competition among their increasing numbers may 
from time to time result in small decreases in the oil price. 
Implications for New Zealand’s oil future
According to the IEA website, New Zealand’s energy demand 
is increasing. About 50% of  New Zealand energy is supplied 
by imported oil and its largest domestic source of  oil (the 
Maui oil fields) is running out steadily (Natusch, 2008, p.57). 
According to the BP statistical review (2007), New Zealand oil 
imports increased by 1.2% from 2005 to 2006. It should be 
noted that these statistics only relate to crude oil importation 
and do not cover countries’ indirect economic dependency 
on oil. As the price of  oil increases the cost of  most if  not 
all imported products will also increase. This will have a 
negative impact on the domestic economy and eventually on 
exports. Although imported oil presents the biggest challenge 
that the New Zealand energy sector is facing, the economic 
implications of  higher prices are not confined to the energy 
sector. Evidence of  this has already become clearly apparent 
in the areas of  transport and food. 
New Zealand Oil & Gas argues that New Zealand 
has an exciting future in the energy market, in light of  its 
underdeveloped oil and gas reserves. Whether it is a consumer 
only or a non-OPEC producer, New Zealand needs foreign 
investment to develop or sustain its oil industry. Thus it needs 
to closely observe interactions between the main players and 
their influences in the market. The activities of  OPEC and 
non-OPEC oil-producing countries show that inviting foreign 
investment will have economic and political consequences 
that need to be carefully assessed beforehand. In this 
regard, Norway’s experience in managing resources through 
combining national and capitalisation policies presents a 
successful model. Investing oil revenues in the health and 
education sectors and training professionals to participate 
in the international oil market are opportunities that the 
developing oil industry in New Zealand can offer.
The nationalisation of  oil in Middle Eastern oil-producing 
countries has led to governmental rentier policies. Moreover, 
nationalisation extended governments and made them reliant 
on the rent from natural resources. However, limiting the New 
Zealand government’s monitory role over the development 
of  this country’s oil industry could have a negative impact 
on the economy. The lack of  government involvement in the 
activities of  the industry will minimise its ability to ensure 
that the public will receive benefits from such developments. 
The Norwegian government’s involvement in its country’s 
oil industry and receiving tax from investing companies 
enables the government to monitor investors. Experiences 
in oil-producing countries demonstrate that such monitoring 
systems are vital to ensure the best use of  natural resources. 
If  it is fully involved in oil contracting processes, the New 
Zealand government will be better able to guarantee economic 
benefits for the health, education, and other, sectors. 
[For New Zealand] the lack of government 
involvement in the activities of the industry will 
minimise its ability to ensure that the public will 
receive benefits from such developments.   
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Conclusion
As discussed in this article, main players in the market and 
their national policies, organisations like OPEC and the 
IEA, major oil companies and speculators all influence the 
price of  oil and market fluctuation. Competition among 
the main players at national and organisational levels over 
consumption places more pressure on producing countries 
to increase production. Lack of  infrastructure, competition 
among producers and concerns over geopolitics and the peak 
of  oil have limited production capacity.4 
Fluctuations in the oil market will continue. However, 
there are factors that may slow the rapid increase in the 
price of  oil. It is evident that returning to the beginning of  
2007 when oil was $US50 a barrel seems impossible, but 
progress in the security situation in the Middle East would 
push the price down. The possibility of  the resumption of  
Iran–US political ties, improvement in the security situation 
in Iraq, and investment in oil developing projects could all 
ease the contemporary situation. The existing situation 
reminds governments that the energy market is vulnerable 
and susceptible to fluctuations. The IEA policies on keeping 
oil savings and encouraging co-operation amongst consumers 
helped the governments decide on more harmonious policies. 
But these policies have not been very successful in handling 
the current oil crisis, which reflects the increasing number 
of  players in the oil market and its interconnection with the 
global economy and international security.
For consuming countries, ensuring the sustainable 
supply of  energy is vital to economic development and 
national security. Besides encouraging efficient use of  energy, 
developing alternative sources and co-operating with the IEA, 
in times of  crisis governments need to intervene in the market 
in order to limit the negative effects of  economic recession in 
the shorter term. 
1 The Arab oil embargo of 1973, Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 1973, Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act 1975 and the creation of the US Department of Energy in 1977. 
See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/chronology/
petroleumchronology2000.htm. 
2  Lord Oxburgh was chairman of Shell from 2004 to 2005. 
3  For further information on the decrease of oil production in non-OPEC producers, with 
reference to New Zealand, see IEA, International Energy Annual, Short Term Energy Outlook, 
Table 3a, Table 3b (forecast values).
4  Many producing countries, mainly the hawks, argue that there is enough oil in the market as 
the result of the pressure of the United States and the United Nations on Saudi Arabia. The 
latter has promised to increase production, but only by 200,000 barrels a day. Such a minor 
increase prompts speculation over Saudi Arabia’s production capacity.
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